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DRAFT	  2/9/14	  
THE	  PARALLEL	  MARCH	  OF	  THE	  GINIS:	  
HOW	  DOES	  TAXATION	  RELATE	  TO	  INEQUALITY	  
AND	  WHAT	  CAN	  BE	  DONE	  ABOUT	  IT?	  




The	  United	  States	  currently	  has	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  inequality	  among	  industrialized	  economies.	  
In	  addition,	  numerous	  scholars	  have	  shown	  that	  social	  mobility	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  significantly	  lower	  
than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1945	  and	  1970,	  when	  inequality	  was	  also	  declining.	  The	  combination	  
of	  these	  trends	  is	  dangerous	  because	  it	  risks	  transforming	  the	  US	  into	  a	  society	  where	  small	  elites	  
capture	  most	  of	  the	  gains,	  a	  pattern	  in	  which	  growth	  cannot	  be	  sustained	  over	  time	  (Acemoglu	  and	  
Robinson	  2012,	  Zingales	  2012).	  The	  level	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  US	  after	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  are	  taken	  into	  
account	  is	  much	  lower,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  higher	  than	  in	  most	  OECD	  countries	  and	  the	  trend	  is	  still	  for	  
inequality	  to	  increase.	  This	  paper	  explores	  how	  the	  US	  tax	  system	  can	  be	  used	  to	  counter	  these	  trends	  
and	  concludes	  that	  the	  key	  is	  not	  to	  increase	  taxes	  on	  the	  rich	  (although	  some	  reforms	  in	  this	  direction	  
can	  be	  adopted),	  but	  instead	  to	  adequately	  fund	  and	  even	  strengthen	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  The	  only	  way	  
to	  do	  this	  in	  the	  medium	  to	  longer	  term	  is	  to	  adopt	  a	  broad-­‐based	  federal	  consumption	  tax.	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The	  United	  States	  currently	  has	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  inequality	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (OECD),	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  
before	  taxes	  and	  transfers.	  The	  US	  Gini	  coefficient	  before	  taxes	  is	  0.49,	  measured	  on	  a	  scale	  in	  which	  
100	  is	  perfect	  inequality	  (one	  person	  has	  all	  the	  income)	  and	  0	  is	  perfect	  equality.	  Table	  1	  shows	  that	  the	  
US	  Gini	  is	  higher	  than	  most	  of	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  OECD,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  higher	  than	  many	  
developing	  countries	  (e.g.,	  India).	  	  
Insert	  Table	  1	  
This	  level	  of	  inequality	  would	  not	  matter	  if	  social	  mobility	  in	  the	  US	  were	  high,	  because	  in	  that	  case	  
every	  US	  child	  could	  achieve	  the	  “American	  dream.”	  	  However,	  a	  recent	  OECD	  study	  pointed	  out	  that	  
“[m]obility	  in	  earnings	  across	  pairs	  of	  fathers	  and	  sons	  is	  particularly	  low	  in	  France,	  Italy,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  while	  mobility	  is	  higher	  in	  the	  Nordic	  countries,	  Australia	  and	  Canada.”	  
(OECD	  2010,	  p.	  183).	  The	  US	  ranked	  third	  from	  the	  bottom	  among	  the	  twelve	  countries	  studied.	  The	  
main	  reason	  was	  that	  the	  US	  ranked	  first	  in	  the	  influence	  of	  parental	  background	  on	  student	  
achievement	  in	  secondary	  education	  (OECD	  2010,	  Fig.	  5.3).	  In	  general,	  the	  OECD	  found	  that	  
intergenerational	  social	  mobility	  tends	  to	  be	  lower	  in	  more	  unequal	  societies	  (OECD	  2010,	  Fig.	  5.10).	  
Numerous	  scholars	  have	  shown	  that	  social	  mobility	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  significantly	  lower	  now	  than	  it	  
was	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1945	  and	  1970,	  when	  inequality	  was	  also	  declining	  (Frank,	  2014).	  The	  
combination	  of	  these	  trends	  is	  dangerous	  because	  it	  risks	  transforming	  the	  US	  into	  a	  society	  where	  small	  
elites	  capture	  most	  of	  the	  gains,	  a	  pattern	  in	  which	  growth	  cannot	  be	  sustained	  over	  time	  (Acemoglu	  
and	  Robinson	  2012,	  Zingales	  2012).	  	  As	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  demonstrate,	  societies	  with	  “extractive”	  
institutions	  tend	  to	  stagnate	  in	  comparison	  with	  societies	  with	  “inclusive”	  institutions.	  Moreover,	  as	  
Zingales	  points	  out,	  the	  US	  used	  to	  be	  more	  inclusive	  but	  is	  now	  becoming	  more	  extractive	  as	  
established	  elites	  use	  their	  financial	  resources	  to	  lobby	  for	  and	  capture	  economic	  rents.	  A	  classic	  
example	  is	  the	  tax	  treatment	  of	  the	  labor	  income	  of	  hedge	  fund	  managers	  as	  capital	  gains	  taxed	  at	  half	  
the	  rate.	  
How	  does	  taxation	  enter	  into	  the	  picture?	  The	  level	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  US	  after	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  are	  
taken	  into	  account	  is	  significantly	  lower,	  although	  it	  is	  still	  higher	  than	  in	  most	  OECD	  countries	  and	  the	  
trend	  is	  still	  for	  inequality	  to	  increase:	  
Insert	  Table	  2	  
The	  striking	  fact	  visible	  in	  the	  data	  above	  is	  that	  the	  trend	  line	  is	  the	  same	  from	  1984	  to	  2008,	  i.e.,	  the	  
Gini	  coefficient	  moves	  more	  or	  less	  in	  parallel	  before	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  and	  after	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  
are	  taken	  into	  account.	  This	  pattern	  is	  surprising	  because	  (a)	  the	  US	  relies	  heavily	  on	  individual	  income	  
taxes,	  and	  those	  taxes	  are	  very	  progressive;	  (b)	  the	  top	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  and	  the	  tax	  rates	  on	  capital	  
gains	  and	  dividends	  changed	  numerous	  times	  during	  the	  relevant	  period,	  so	  if	  progressive	  income	  
taxation	  reduces	  inequality,	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  before	  and	  after	  tax	  Ginis	  to	  diverge	  rather	  than	  
march	  in	  parallel.	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Compared	  to	  other	  countries,	  the	  US	  relied	  heavily	  on	  individual	  income	  taxes	  throughout	  the	  relevant	  
period,	  and	  those	  taxes	  are	  quite	  progressive.	  In	  2001,	  the	  top	  1%	  of	  the	  US	  population	  by	  adjusted	  
gross	  income	  (AGI)	  paid	  33.89%	  of	  federal	  personal	  income	  tax,	  and	  the	  top	  5%	  paid	  53.25%	  (by	  
comparison,	  the	  bottom	  50%	  of	  the	  AGI	  distribution	  paid	  less	  than	  4%	  of	  total	  income	  taxes	  collected).	  
This	  is	  a	  significant	  increase	  from	  1994,	  when	  the	  top	  1%	  of	  taxpayers	  only	  paid	  28.7%	  of	  federal	  
personal	  income	  tax.	  In	  2004,	  even	  after	  President	  Bush’s	  tax	  cuts,	  the	  top	  1%	  still	  paid	  32.3%	  of	  federal	  
individual	  income	  taxes	  and	  the	  top	  5%	  paid	  53.7%.	  In	  2008,	  the	  top	  quintile	  paid	  94.6%	  of	  federal	  
individual	  income	  taxes,	  the	  highest	  percentage	  since	  1979	  (IRS	  2013).	  
Given	  this	  level	  of	  progressivity,	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  US	  Gini	  after	  taxes	  increased	  steadily	  during	  the	  
entire	  period	  from	  1983	  to	  2008,	  in	  parallel	  to	  the	  before	  tax	  GIni.	  Moreover,	  if	  one	  examines	  the	  
movements	  of	  the	  top	  individual	  tax	  rate	  in	  that	  period,	  one	  can	  see	  quite	  dramatic	  fluctuations:	  It	  went	  
from	  50%	  in	  1983	  down	  to	  28%	  in	  1986,	  then	  gradually	  up	  to	  39.6%	  in	  1993,	  then	  down	  to	  35%	  in	  2001,	  
and	  back	  to	  39.6%	  in	  2012.	  The	  capital	  gains	  rate	  went	  up	  from	  20%	  in	  1983	  to	  28%	  in	  1986,	  then	  down	  
to	  20%	  in	  1997,	  then	  down	  again	  to	  15%	  in	  2003,	  and	  up	  to	  20%	  in	  2012.	  	  None	  of	  these	  changes	  seem	  
to	  have	  made	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  after-­‐tax	  Gini.	  
A	  more	  detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  data,	  however,	  suggests	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  puzzle.	  Table	  3	  shows	  
the	  Congressional	  Budget	  Office	  (CBO,	  2011)	  estimate	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  to	  the	  
reduction	  in	  the	  Gini	  coefficient:	  
Insert	  Table	  3	  
The	  table	  indicates	  that	  (a)	  there	  has	  been	  some	  decline	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  
reduce	  the	  Gini	  from	  1979	  to	  2007,	  but	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  still	  quite	  progressive,	  reducing	  the	  Gini	  
by	  about	  17%;	  (b)	  both	  taxes	  and	  transfers	  contribute	  to	  the	  reduction,	  but	  transfers	  contribute	  more	  
than	  taxes;	  (c)	  after	  1986,	  despite	  numerous	  changes	  in	  the	  tax	  rates,	  the	  contribution	  of	  taxes	  to	  
decreasing	  inequality	  is	  essentially	  flat,	  while	  all	  the	  fluctuation	  is	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  transfers	  (since	  the	  
overall	  line	  tracks	  the	  transfers	  line).	  
These	  data	  suggest	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  increasing	  inequality	  is	  not	  more	  progressive	  income	  taxation.	  
High	  rates	  of	  income	  taxation	  raise	  familiar	  problems	  such	  as	  increased	  tax	  avoidance,	  choosing	  leisure	  
over	  labor,	  and	  potentially	  emigrating	  to	  low-­‐tax	  jurisdictions	  (Avi-­‐Yonah,	  2012).	  	  While	  the	  US	  top	  
individual	  tax	  rate	  is	  lower	  than	  that	  in	  some	  OECD	  countries,	  those	  countries	  typically	  have	  lower	  rates	  
on	  capital	  income,	  which	  is	  highly	  concentrated	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  income	  distribution.	  This	  comparison	  
suggests	  that	  in	  a	  globalized	  world,	  the	  US	  does	  not	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  capacity	  to	  raise	  the	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  
rich	  further;	  certainly	  the	  70%	  top	  marginal	  rate	  of	  1980,	  or	  the	  94%	  tax	  rate	  of	  the	  1950s,	  appear	  
unlikely	  to	  return	  when	  the	  rich	  can	  easily	  move	  to	  other	  countries,	  give	  up	  their	  US	  citizenship,	  and	  
enjoy	  much	  lower	  rates.	  
Overall,	  the	  US	  tax	  and	  transfer	  system	  has	  a	  very	  significant	  impact	  on	  inequality:	  As	  Table	  2	  indicates,	  
it	  reduces	  the	  US	  Gini	  by	  about	  10	  points,	  which	  is	  more	  than	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  pre-­‐tax	  Gini	  of	  
the	  US	  and	  Sweden.	  So	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  progressive	  tax	  system	  that	  does	  the	  work,	  what	  does?	  The	  answer	  
must	  be	  the	  much-­‐maligned	  “entitlements”:	  Social	  Security,	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid.	  These	  programs	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are	  very	  progressive	  because	  while	  only	  Medicaid	  is	  means	  tested,	  their	  benefits	  are	  more	  important	  to	  
the	  poor,	  while	  the	  funding	  comes	  from	  progressive	  taxation	  of	  labor	  income	  (although	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Social	  Security	  the	  funding	  could	  be	  made	  more	  progressive	  by	  eliminating	  the	  income	  cap).	  
Thus,	  one	  key	  to	  reducing	  inequality	  in	  the	  US	  is	  to	  bolster	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  We	  should	  at	  least	  
maintain	  current	  benefits	  and	  possibly	  increase	  them.	  In	  particular,	  Social	  Security	  should	  be	  
strengthened	  since	  most	  baby	  boomers	  do	  not	  have	  nearly	  enough	  saved	  for	  retirement	  (and	  many	  
have	  seen	  their	  savings	  decimated	  by	  the	  Great	  Recession).	  The	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  has	  strengthened	  
health	  care,	  but	  it	  will	  probably	  require	  more	  funding	  to	  support	  insurance	  for	  persons	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  
conditions	  and	  the	  poor	  if	  not	  enough	  young,	  healthy	  people	  sign	  up	  for	  the	  exchanges.	  
Moreover,	  strengthening	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  is	  important	  to	  sustaining	  growth.	  Open	  economies	  tend	  
to	  have	  stronger	  safety	  nets,	  because	  the	  gains	  from	  having	  an	  open	  economy	  tend	  to	  impose	  risk	  on	  
the	  people	  who	  lose	  from	  globalization,	  so	  that	  a	  strong	  safety	  net	  is	  in	  a	  democracy	  a	  precondition	  to	  
obtaining	  widespread	  political	  support	  for	  openness,	  which	  in	  turn	  produces	  growth	  (Avi-­‐Yonah,	  2000).	  
Thus,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  avoid	  the	  pattern	  that	  led	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  era	  of	  globalization	  a	  hundred	  years	  
ago,	  we	  need	  to	  maintain	  a	  strong	  safety	  net	  lest	  the	  US	  public	  vote	  for	  protectionism,	  decreased	  
immigration,	  and	  less	  tolerance	  for	  the	  “creative	  destruction”	  of	  technologically	  inspired	  growth.	  
How	  can	  the	  US	  safety	  net	  be	  financially	  sustained	  in	  the	  long	  run?	  The	  answer	  cannot	  be	  more	  deficit	  
financing,	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  this	  just	  means	  passing	  the	  buck	  to	  our	  children,	  which	  seems	  both	  
unfair	  and	  risky:	  As	  the	  population	  ages	  the	  number	  of	  working	  age	  adults	  to	  seniors	  (the	  dependency	  
ratio)	  will	  decline	  in	  the	  US	  as	  it	  already	  did	  elsewhere,	  unless	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  much	  more	  
immigration,	  which	  carries	  its	  own	  risks	  (Collier,	  2013).	  Second,	  much	  of	  the	  US	  Treasury	  debt	  is	  held	  by	  
China,	  and	  that	  is	  exactly	  how	  the	  UK	  lost	  its	  position	  as	  a	  great	  power	  after	  World	  War	  II:	  Too	  much	  of	  
its	  debt	  was	  held	  by	  the	  US,	  which	  was	  able	  to	  dictate	  terms.	  
Nor	  is	  the	  answer	  raising	  the	  income	  tax.	  There	  are	  not	  enough	  rich	  people	  to	  support	  the	  safety	  net,	  
and	  as	  stated	  above	  the	  rich	  can	  adjust	  to	  higher	  rate	  by	  avoiding	  taxes,	  working	  less,	  or	  moving.	  Nor	  
would	  it	  be	  wise	  to	  increase	  the	  income	  tax	  on	  corporations	  (they	  can	  move	  even	  more	  easily	  than	  the	  
rich)	  or	  on	  the	  middle	  class,	  since	  they	  already	  carry	  heavy	  burdens	  and	  cannot	  afford	  to	  bear	  the	  entire	  
load	  (Warren	  and	  Tyagi,	  2007).	  
Another	  reason	  why	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  cannot	  be	  financed	  by	  increased	  taxes	  on	  labor	  (either	  income	  
or	  payroll	  taxes)	  is	  inter-­‐generational	  equity.	  The	  benefits	  of	  Social	  Security	  and	  Medicare	  flow	  to	  the	  old,	  
while	  income	  and	  payroll	  taxes	  are	  borne	  by	  the	  young.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  dependency	  ratio	  concerns	  
raised	  above,	  it	  seems	  unfair	  (and	  will	  certainly	  appear	  so	  to	  many	  young	  voters)	  to	  transfer	  so	  much	  
from	  the	  young	  to	  the	  old.	  	  
The	  only	  solution	  is	  to	  enact	  a	  broad	  federal	  consumption	  tax,	  i.e.,	  a	  Value	  Added	  Tax	  (VAT).	  This	  
proposal	  has	  been	  developed	  in	  detail	  elsewhere	  (Avi-­‐Yonah,	  2010).	  For	  present	  purposes,	  a	  VAT	  has	  an	  
important	  advantage:	  Unlike	  income	  and	  payroll	  taxes,	  consumption	  taxes	  do	  not	  discourage	  work,	  and	  
because	  the	  old	  as	  well	  as	  the	  young	  consume,	  they	  are	  borne	  in	  significant	  part	  by	  the	  principal	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beneficiaries	  of	  the	  social	  safety	  net.	  In	  addition,	  VATs	  are	  used	  in	  over	  150	  countries	  and	  have	  a	  
demonstrated	  capacity	  to	  raise	  revenues	  even	  with	  far	  weaker	  tax	  administrations	  than	  the	  IRS.	  	  
The	  VAT	  is	  regressive,	  and	  while	  there	  are	  ways	  to	  mitigate	  regressivity	  within	  the	  VAT	  like	  exempting	  
basic	  living	  necessities,	  such	  exemptions	  subsidize	  well-­‐off	  consumers	  and	  make	  the	  tax	  needlessly	  
complicated.	  If	  VAT	  revenues	  are	  segregated	  and	  used	  to	  fund	  Social	  Security,	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid,	  
the	  inherent	  progressivity	  of	  those	  programs	  mitigates	  the	  regressivity	  of	  the	  underlying	  tax.	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  addition	  to	  bolstering	  the	  safety	  net,	  a	  VAT	  can	  be	  used	  to	  fund	  opportunity	  programs	  for	  
the	  next	  generation,	  like	  universal	  pre-­‐K,	  which	  will	  contribute	  directly	  to	  improving	  social	  mobility.	  The	  
biggest	  obstacle	  to	  enhancing	  social	  mobility	  in	  the	  US	  is	  that	  by	  the	  time	  children	  start	  formal	  schooling	  
many	  of	  them	  lag	  so	  far	  behind	  their	  peers	  that	  even	  good	  public	  schools	  cannot	  enable	  them	  to	  get	  to	  
college,	  which	  is	  the	  essential	  gateway	  to	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  a	  technology	  dominated	  economy.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  challenge	  in	  enacting	  a	  VAT	  is	  political.	  Rep.	  Ullman,	  who	  was	  Chair	  of	  Ways	  and	  Means	  
in	  the	  1970s,	  supposedly	  was	  defeated	  after	  proposing	  one.	  But	  this	  story	  is	  a	  myth,	  and	  good	  politicians	  
like	  John	  Howard	  of	  Australia	  have	  managed	  to	  build	  a	  broad	  legislative	  coalition	  to	  enact	  a	  VAT	  even	  
after	  promising	  not	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  to	  win	  re-­‐election	  decisively.	  A	  VAT	  serves	  the	  right’s	  need	  for	  fiscal	  
balance	  and	  the	  left’s	  need	  to	  expand	  social	  outlays,	  so	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  ultimate	  “grand	  bargain”	  
in	  American	  politics.	  It	  is	  a	  fair	  and	  sensible	  way	  to	  address	  the	  inequality	  that	  threatens	  our	  future.	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